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LENDER LIABILITY-BANKS As "FACT-SENSITIVE FIDUCIARIES:"
IT'S ALL IN THE PLEADINGS. Mans v. Peoples Bank, 340 Ark. 518, 10
S.W.3d 885 (2000).
I. INTRODUCTION
When a traditional, formal fiduciary relationship is not in existence,
courts have consistently relied on the facts and circumstances of the
case to determine the scope of the relationship. However, courts have
not consistently reached the same result or applied the same standards
when dealing with a bank and its customer. This area of the law is,
therefore, vague and imprecise. On one hand, customers find it difficult
to prove that a bank owed them any special duty. At the same time,
lenders may be left wondering what conduct on their part is permissible
without subjecting themselves to the possibility of liability under a non-
traditional fiduciary standard. Furthermore, when a bank engages in the
sale of credit life insurance to its customers, a bank may bring itself intc
the realm of agency law, making it easier for a court to find a fiduciary
duty. The Arkansas Supreme Court recently recognized the importance
of pleading specific facts in order to establish a fiduciary-like relation-
ship between a bank and its customer in Mans v. Peoples Bank.'
The note begins by detailing the state of affairs that resulted in thiE
case coming before the Arkansas Supreme Court. The note then
addresses how courts typically treat a bank-customer relationship,
followed by a discussion of the circumstances that may result in the
finding of a non-traditional fiduciary relationship. By way of illustra-
tion, the note then provides examples of cases in which courts were
faced with the issue of what duty a bank owed to its customer. Next,
the note examines the Arkansas Supreme Court's reasoning for its
decision in Mans. Finally, the note addresses the significance of this
case for future plaintiffs who claim that their bank owed them a duty in
a certain situation, as well as for the banks defending those claims.
1I. FACTS
Laverne and Jimmie Mans, husband and wife, borrowed money to
finance home improvements from the Peoples Bank of Imboden ("the
Bank").2 They executed a promissory note in the amount of $25,949.55
on June 21, 1993.2 This was not the first time Mr. and Mrs. Mans had
1. 340 Ark. 518, 10 S.W.3d 885 (2000).
2. See Mans v. Peoples Bank, 340 Ark. 518, 519, 10 S.W.3d 885, 886 (2000).
3. See id., 10 S.W.3d at 886.
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done business with the Bank." In fact, they had been banking with the
Peoples Bank since Mrs. Mans moved to Imboden in 1974.- Despite
such a long relationship, Mrs. Mans had not actually visited the Bank
on many occasions.6
Mr. and Mrs. Mans had previously taken out a loan from the Bank
on their house and property in September of 1984 for just over $10,000. 7
At that time, they also took out a credit life policy on the note.8 In
November of 1991, they obtained a second loan through the Bank.9 The
Manses did not take out credit life insurance on this note, nor did they
discuss purchasing it.'"
Mrs. Mans testified that prior to executing the June 1993 loan,
which is the loan involved in this lawsuit, she told an employee of the
Bank, Janet Clark, to make sure that she and her husband had a credit
life policy in effect." Mrs. Mans stated that they took out the credit life
policy because they were aging; therefore, they felt they needed
insurance that would pay off the loan in case anything was to happen to
either of them.'2
When the Manses executed the June 1993 loan, they also signed a
Truth-in-Lending Disclosure, which informed them that they had the
option to purchase credit life insurance. 3 Because they had already
decided that they needed this insurance, the Manses obtained a policy
through the Bank, which acted as an agent for American Pioneer Life
Insurance Company. 4  As agent, the Bank received thirty to forty
percent of credit life insurance premiums.15
4. See Abstract and Brief of Appellant at 4, Mans v. Peoples Bank, 340 Ark. 518,
10 S.W.3d 885 (2000) (No. 99-773).
5. See id.
6. See id. at 8.
7. See id. at 5.
8. See id.
9. See id. at 6.
10. See Abstract and Brief of Appellant at 8, Mans (No. 99-773). Mrs. Mans stated
that whenever she and her husband were in need of money, they jointly decided
whether to borrow from the Bank. See id. at 11. Then, Mrs. Mans went on to state that
her husband would call the Bank, and someone from the Bank would say something
such as, "Well, yeah, Jim, we'll fix you right up, go get what you want and then come
on in, we'll get you fixed up." Id.
11. See id. at 7.
12. See id. at 6.
13. See id at l.
14. See Mans, 340 Ark, at 519, 10 S.W.3d at 886.
15. See Abstract and Brief of Appellant at 12, Mans (No. 99-773).
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Both the promissory note and the credit life policy had terms of two
years. 6 The Manses financed the credit life policy annual premium of
$1054.55, along with the note, based on a ten-year amortization
schedule. 7 Under this financing arrangement, the Manses would make
monthly payments in the amount of $351.70 for twenty-three months,
with the balance of $21,666.72 due two years later on June 21, 1995."'
When the note matured, the Manses did not have the money to pay the
balance. 9 Therefore, Mr. Mans went to the Bank alone and negotiated
an extension on the note. 0 On this same date, the credit life insurance
policy also expired.2
The chief executive officer of the Bank, Preston Clark, testified in
his deposition that customers of the Bank rely on the Bank for certain
services.22 Although Mrs. Mans never testified that she was aware of
such a practice, Mr. Clark stated that the Bank had an unwritten policy
of notifying customers when a credit life policy had lapsed at the same
time that a note had matured.' Despite such an unwritten policy, Mrs.
Mans testified that neither she nor her husband ever received oral or
written notice of the lapse.24 The Manses did not in fact purchase
another credit life policy,' but their monthly payments under the note
remained the same.26
16. See Mans, 340 Ark. at 519, 10 S.W.3d at 886.
17. See id. at 519-20, 10 S.W.3d at 886.
18. See Abstract and Brief of Appellant at 5, Mans (No. 99-773).
19. See Abstract and Brief of Appellee at 2, Mans v. Peoples Bank, 340 Ark. 518,
10 S.W.3d 885 (2000) (No. 99-773).
20. See Abstract and Brief of Appellant at 9, Mans (No. 99-773). Mrs. Mans
testified that she did not know what was said between the Bank and her husband at this
time, but she knew that her husband was certain that he had credit life insurance. See
id.
21. See Mans, 340 Ark. at 520, 10 S.W.3d at 886.
22. See Abstract and Brief of Appellant at 13, Mans (No. 99-773).
23. See Mans, 340 Ark. at 526, 10 S.W.3d at 890. Mr. Clark also explained another
practice of the Bank. See Abstract and Brief of Appellant at 13, Mans (No. 99-773).
He stated that the Bank makes credit life available to its customers but cannot require
them to purchase the coverage. See id. The Bank employee generally asks the
customers whether they want credit life, tells them what the premium will be, and then
lets them make the final decision as to whether to purchase. See id.
24. See Abstract and Brief of Appellant at 23, Mans (No. 99-773).
25. See Abstract and Brief of Appellee at 2, Mans (No. 99-773).
26. See Mans, 340 Ark. at 520, 10 S.W.3d at 886. Mrs. Mans testified that she
assumed that the credit life policy had been extended because the payments were the
same. See Abstract and Brief of Appellant at 10, Mans (No. 99-773). However, she
also acknowledged that she knew the premium had been financed over ten years. See
id.
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After Mr. Mans died on July 23, 1997, Mrs. Mans discovered for
the first time that the credit life policy had not been extended beyond
the original two years.2" When she asked the Bank to make a claim to
the insurance company to pay off the balance of the note, the Bank
informed her that the policy had lapsed over two years before on the
same date that the note had expired.' Mrs. Mans testified that no one
from the Bank had called to inform her or her husband that their policy
needed to be extended, nor did they receive any letter from the Bank
stating the same." Although she had signed the disclosure statement
stating that the policy was in effect for twenty-four months, she
believed that the policy had been extended at the time the note was
extended.30 She stated that had* she known that the policy had expired,
she would have renewed it."
On September 10, 1997, Mrs. Mans refinanced the note through the
Arkansas Bank and paid off the balance to the Peoples Bank.32 Nearly
one year after her husband's death, Mrs. Mans filed suit against the
Bank for negligence in failing to notify her that the credit life policy had
expired.33 Mrs. Mans sought judgment against the Bank in an amount
equal to the balance due on the date of her husband's death, in addition
to all payments that she had paid since that day, pre- and post-judgment
interest, her costs, and a reasonable attorney's fee.' The Bank denied
any liability in its initial answer to the complaint and later amended its
answer to plead the doctrine of comparative fault.35 The Bank stated
that Mrs. Mans was either equally or more at fault than the Bank and
should, therefore, be barred from recovery or receive a reduced
recovery.36
A jury trial commenced in the Circuit Court of Lawrence County,
Arkansas, on January 27, 1999." After Mrs. Mans presented her case,
the attorney for the Bank moved for a directed verdict on the ground
that Mrs. Mans and the Bank had a relationship of debtor and creditor,
27. See Mans, 340 Ark. at 520, 10 S.W.3d at 886.
28. See id, 10 S.W.3d at 886.
29. See Abstract and Brief of Appellant at 7, Mans (No. 99-773).
30. See id. at 9.
31. See id. at 8.
32. See id. at 6. Mrs. Mans testified that she ended her twenty-three year
relationship with the Bank after this incident because she felt that she had been treated
unfairly and could no longer trust the Bank. See id.
33. See Mans, 340 Ark. at 520, 10 S.W.3d at 886.
34. See Abstract and Brief of Appellant at 2, Mans (No. 99-773).
35. See id at 2-3.
36. See id at 3.
37. See id. at 29.
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and Mrs. Mans had not established proof of any relationship beyond
debtor-creditor."' The Bank's attorney also turned the court's attention
to the case of Scott-HuffInsurance Agency v. Sanduslyj9 for the proposition
that the insured is responsible for educating himself about his
coverage.' As an alternate argument, the Bank argued that there was
no proof that the Bank did not tell Mr. Mans that the policy had lapsed.4'
As a third basis for the motion, the Bank's attorney argued that before
Mrs. Mans could file such a complaint, there had to be proof that she
actually made a claim to the insurance carrier and was denied.42
In response to this motion, Mrs. Mans's attorney argued to the
court that the Manses continued to pay the same monthly payment after
the policy had expired. 3 Because of this fact, Mrs. Mans assumed that
the policy had been extended, and she placed her trust in the Bank to
inform her if the policy had expired." In response to opposing coun-
sel's third argument that there was no proof that Mrs. Mans had made
a claim and been denied, counsel for Mrs. Mans stated that the Bank
was the agent of the insurance company and, for all practical purposes,
was the insurance company.4
The trial court granted the Bank's motion for directed verdict,
finding that no duty existed on the part of the Bank under any negli-
gence theory to inform the Manses that the credit life policy had
lapsed.' Mrs. Mans appealed the decision to the Arkansas Court of
Appeals on February 26, 1999."' She argued that the trial court erred in
not finding a duty on the part of the Bank to notify her of a lapse in her
credit life insurance policy." The court of appeals transferred the case
to the Arkansas Supreme.Court on the basis that it was an issue of first
impression, presenting the opportunity for the supreme court to address
potential liability of lenders in such cases. 9
38. See Mans, 340 Ark. at 520, 10 S.W.3d at 886.
39. 318 Ark. 613, 887 S.W.2d 516(1994).
40. See Abstract and Brief of Appellant at 14, Mans (No. 99-773).
41. See Mans, 340 Ark. at 520, 10 S.W.3d at 886. To support this contention, the
Bank's attorney pointed out that Mr. Clark had no notes stating whether he did or did
not tell Mr. Mans that the policy had lapsed. See Abstract and Brief of Appellant at 15,
Mans (No. 99-773).
42. See Abstract and Brief of Appellant at 15, Mans (No. 99-773).
43. See Mans, 340 Ark. at 520, 10 S.W.3d at 886.
44. See id., 10 S.W.3d at 886.
45. See Abstract and Brief of Appellant at 17, Mans (No. 99-773).
46. See Mans, 340 Ark. at 520-21, 10 S.W.3d at 886.
47. See Abstract and Brief of Appellant at 4, Mans (No. 99-773).
48. See Mans, 340 Ark. at 521, 10 S.W.3d at 886.
49. See Abstract and Brief of Appellant, Mans (No. 99-773) (the specific page to
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III. BACKGROUND
A. Bank-Customer Relationship Is Ordinarily Debtor-Creditor
Courts have generally found the relationship between a bank and
its customers to be that of debtor and creditor." In fact, when a
customer deposits money in a bank, the Arkansas Supreme Court has
stated that the relationship of debtor-creditor is "unquestionably the
law."5 A depositor is the bank's creditor to the extent of the funds
deposited with the bank. 2 A depositor may also be a bank's debtor if
the bank permits checking overdrafts. 3 This standard deposit contract
is governed by the principles found in Part Four of Article Four of the
Uniform Commercial Code.'
The customer's money on deposit at the bank becomes part of the
bank's general fund, and the bank has the right to loan it to other bank
customers." The customer in turn has the right to have his debt repaid
upon request or by virtue of the bank honoring the customer's checks
written against the deposit.5 6 The parties to the relationship are said to
transact with one another at arm's length.' This relationship of rights
and obligations thus creates a simple debtor-creditor relationship with
no fiduciary implications." Conversely, when the bank acts as a lender
to the customer, the relationship changes; the bank is now the creditor,
and the customer is the debtor.5 9 Although the roles have reversed in
which this sentence refers was not numbered but was placed between page (i) and (ii)
of the abstract).
50. See Bruce E. H. Johnson, Lender Liability Litigation Checklist: A Summary of
Current Theories and Developments, 59 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REv. 205, 217 (1991). See,
e.g., Country Comer Food & Drug, Inc. v. First State Bank & Trust Co., 332 Ark. 645,
654, 966 S.W.2d 894, 898 (1998); Milam v. Bank of Cabot, 327 Ark. 256, 265, 937
S.W.2d 653, 658 (1997); J.W. Reynolds Lumber Co. v. Smackover State Bank, 310
Ark. 342, 346, 836 S.W.2d 853, 855 (1992).
51. See J.W. Reynolds Lumber Co. v. Smackover State Bank, 310 Ark. 342, 347,
836 S.W.2d 853, 855 (1992) (quoting Cherokee Carpet Mills v. Worthen Bank, 262
Ark. 776, 561 S.W.2d 310 (1987)).
52. See BARKLEY CLARK, THE LAW OF BANK DEPosITs, COLLECTIONS AND CREDIT
CARDS 2.01[1], at 2-3 (3d ed. 1990).
53. See id.
54. See id. This part of the UCC is codified at Arkansas Code Annotated sections
4-4-401 to -407 (Michie Repl. 1991).
55. See 5A EDITORIAL STAFF OF THE PUBLISHERS, MICHIE ON BANKS AND BANKING, at
15 (repl. vol. 1994).
56. See id.
57. See Johnson, supra note 50, at 217.
58. See id.
59. See Kenneth W. Curtis, The Fiduciary Controversy: Injection of Fiduciary
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this situation, the relationship is still that of debtor and creditor with no
fiduciary obligations involved.' Although the relationship of debtor
and creditor is generally the rule in most courts, certain situations may
call for a greater duty to exist on the part of the bank.6'
B. When the Relationship Between Bank and Customer Goes
Beyond Debtor-Creditor to Impose a Fiduciary Duty on the
Bank
Courts have typically found two broad categories that impose
fiduciary duties: general or traditional fiduciary duties and specific or
non-traditional fiduciary duties."2 The determination of what type of
relationship a certain situation embodies is important to the determina-
tion of what duties and obligations the parties owe to one another.63
Although traditional fiduciary duties may not be implicated in the
beginning of a bank-customer relationship, certain facts may later
impose fiduciary-like duties on the bank." The traditional fiduciary
relationship is discussed first, followed by a discussion of the fact-
sensitive fiduciary relationship.
1. Traditional Fiduciary Relationships
The concept of fiduciary duty traces its roots back to the English
Court of Chancery.' The King of England granted the court authority
to give relief where the law would not, based on principles of morality
and fairness.' Because of the nature of this court, flexible, fact-specific
principles of equity were created, rather than strict rules of law.67
Principles into the Bank-Depositor and Bank-Borrower Relationships, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
795, 803 (1987) (citing 2 THEODORE EISENBERG, DEBTOR-CREDrrOR LAW 12 A-4 (1986)).
60. See id
61. See id. at 800 (quoting Umbaugh Pole Bldg. Co. v. Scott, 390 N.E.2d 320, 323
(Ohio 1979), as an example of the general rule).
62. See David Unseth, What Level of Fiduciary Duty Should Mortgage Brokers Owe
Their Borrowers?, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1737, 1739-40 (1997).
63. See id. at 1740.
64. See id.
65. See Cecil J. Hunt, II, The Price of Trust: An Examination of Fiduciary Duty and the
Lender-Borrower Relationship, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 719, 728 (1994). The English
Court of Chancery's purpose was "to reflect the conscience of the King as seen through
the moral considerations of the dictates of the church." Id.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 728-29.
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A contract between two parties, such as principal-agent or attorney-
client, can expressly create a traditional fiduciary role.6" According to
the Restatement of Torts, a fiduciary relationship exists when one
person is under a duty to act on behalf of the best interests of another or
offer advice for the benefit of the other upon certain matters that are
within the scope of the parties' relationship.69 Similarly, the Restate-
ment of Trusts imposes on a fiduciary the duty of acting for the benefit
of the other.7" The fiduciary relationship imposes the highest duty owed
under the law."'
Essential to the fiduciary relationship is acceptance on the part of
the one called "fiduciary" of the specific obligations arising under the
relationship.72 Along with acceptance of this duty, a transfer of power
takes place, subject to the limitation that the fiduciary use the power to
maximize the interests of the beneficiary.' Fiduciaries are guided in
their actions by principles of loyalty. 4 Under no circumstances should
a fiduciary sacrifice the interests of his beneficiary to better his own
interests,75 and in a situation where the fiduciary's interests directly
conflict with the interests of the beneficiary, the former must yield to
the latter.76
In addition, the fiduciary must always act with the highest level of
good faith and candor, must disclose to the beneficiary all relevant
information, and must not profit from the relationship." A fiduciary
68. See id. at 731-32.
69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. a (1979). The comment
provides that "[a] fiduciary relation exists between two persons when one of them is
under a duty to act for or to give advice for the benefit of another upon matters within
the scope of the relation." Id.
70. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b (1959). According to the
comment, "[a] person in a fiduciary relation to another is under a duty to act for the
benefit of the other as to matters within the scope of the relation." Id.
71. See Roy Ryden Anderson, The Wolf at the Campfire: Understanding Confidential
Relationships, 53 SMU L. REv. 315, 317 (2000).
72. See Niels B. Schaumann, The Lender as Unconventional Fiduciary, 23 SETON
HALL L. REV. 21, 27 (1992).
73. See id. at 27-28.
74. See Eileen A. Scallen, Promises Broken vs. Promises Betrayed: Metaphor, Analogy,
and the New Fiduciary Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 897, 909 (1993).
75. See id.
76. See Anderson, supra note 71, at 317.
77. See id. Justice Cardozo characterized the fiduciary relationship as follows:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at
ann's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is
held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard
of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and
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would be violating his duty if he took any type of benefit for himself,
such as a bribe or kickback, or delegated away the discretion entrusted
to him by the beneficiary."s The more discretion that is given to him by
the beneficiary, the larger the fiduciary duty he has.' Individuals with
such fiduciary obligations are normally aware that they are not acting
at arm's length with their respective beneficiaries."
A traditional fiduciary relationship does not require the element of
reliance on the part of the beneficiary."' Because of the fiduciary's
heightened duty to act in the best interests of the beneficiary at all
times, a fiduciary will be held liable for a breach of his duty whether or
not the beneficiary actually relied on him and was harmed as a result.8 2
The concept of placing another's interest on the same footing or
above one's own interests is contrary to human nature and explains why
the law has reserved such fiduciary obligations for just a few formal
relationships. 3  Some courts have, however, recently expanded the
fiduciary principles to other types of non-traditional, or informal,
fiduciary relationships where the facts establish a need for such an
obligation. 4
2. Non-Traditional Fiduciary Relationships
a. Factors to Consider
In a traditional fiduciary case, the central issue is the determination
of the exact scope of the fiduciary's duty.85 In contrast, a court faced
with a non-traditional fiduciary situation will .shift its focus from the
inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity
when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the
"disintegrating erosion" of particular exceptions .... Only thus has the level
of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the
crowd.
Id. at 317-18 (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928)).
78. See Scallen, supra note 74, at 910.
79. See id.
80. See Schaumann, supra note 72, at 33-34.
81. See Hunt, supra note 65, at 731.
82. See id. As one scholar expressed this point, "[Tihe law entitles the entrustor
to rely on the fiduciary's trustworthiness. The entrustor is therefore not required to
show that he actually relied on the fiduciary, and the fiduciary has the burden of
justifying self-dealing transactions." Hunt, supra note 65, at 731 (quoting Tamar
Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REv. 795, 824-25 (1983)).
83. See Anderson, supra note 71, at 318.
84. See Hunt, supra note 65, at 736.
85. See Schaumann, supra note 72, at 45.
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scope of the fiduciary's duty to whether a fiduciary relationship even
existed.' If such a relationship is established, then the court will
typically find that the duty claimed was breached."7 Perhaps the most
significant difference between traditional and non-traditional fiduciary
relationships is that the former are based on status of the one party in
relation to the other, i.e. trustee-beneficiary, guardian-ward, etc., while
the latter depend entirely on the facts of the particular situation."
Despite the lack of specific rules defining what constitutes a non-
traditional fiduciary relationship, the cases presented with the issue in
the bank-customer context have articulated several factors that support
a finding of such a relationship. For example, the giving of business
advice by the lender, and in some instances, the lender's actual or
constructive knowledge that the borrower relied on that advice are
relevant to establishing a fiduciary duty. 9 Courts have also considered
the length of the relationship and whether one party has improperly
benefitted from the relationship.9  The relative sophistication of the
borrower as compared to the lender may also be relevant; for example,
a court may require that a borrower be in a position of inequality,
dependence, or weakness of age or mental capability as compared to the
lender.9 In considering whether this relative advantage of the lender is
unfair to the borrower, the court should keep in mind all of the other
surrounding circumstances.' For instance, if the lender does have an
advantage over the borrower, but the borrower is still in a position to
help himself despite this advantage, a duty may not be in order.93
Finally, if a lender holds himself out to the borrower as possessing
86. See id. at 46.
87. See id
88. See Anderson, supra note 71, at 330. Non-traditional relationships are often
characterized by words and phrases such as "placing faith in," "confidence" being
"reposed," and relationships of "trust and confidence." See Scallen, supra note 74, at
922-23. However, these terms alone may offer little guidance for lenders. See id. at
923. The author calls such phrases "metaphors" and states that while metaphors can
add vividness to an otherwise abstract concept, courts have become bound by words
such as "trust" and "arm's length transactions." See id. To quote Justice Cardozo,
"Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate
thought, they end often by enslaving it." Id. (quoting Berky v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155
N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926)).
89. See Schaumann, supra note 72, at 52.
90. See id. at60-61.
91. See Kenneth M. Lodge & Thomas J. Cunningham, The Banker as Inadvertent
Fiduciary: Beware a Borrower's Special Trust and Confidence, 98 COM. L.J. 277, 286
(1993).
92. See id at 294.
93. See id.
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special knowledge or expertise, has made certain representations, or has
failed to disclose certain information to the borrower, a duty may be
created."'
Perhaps the most critical element in proving a non-traditional
fiduciary relationship is a reposing of trust and confidence by one party
in another such that the other will act in the best interest of the one who
has placed his trust and confidence in him.95 A borrower may also have
to prove that the bank expressly or impliedly accepted the trust and
confidence.' A court would be more likely to impose a duty on a
lender if the lender knew or had reason to know that the borrower had
placed trust or confidence in the lender.'
b. Case Examples from Other States
Because of the case-by-case, fact specific nature of the non-
traditional fiduciary relationship, courts have reached varying results
when a bank customer brings a suit against his bank for breach of some
duty, for acting negligently or not acting at all. One scholar in the area
places courts that have been faced with these issues into the following
categories: a distinct minority of courts feel that fiduciary obligations
should never be imposed in debtor-creditor relationships; a large
majority have held that fiduciary obligations can arise in "special
circumstances;" a small, controversial minority have held that the
debtor-creditor relationship is at least "quasi-fiduciary;" and another
small but respected minority have held that there are a number of
"usual, normal, and discrete -aspects" of the debtor-creditor relationship
that impose a fiduciary obligation."
One of the earliest cases to reflect a change in the attitude that the
bank-customer relationship is strictly debtor-creditor is Stewart v.
Phoenix National Bank" The plaintiff, Frank Stewart, had been a
customer of Phoenix National Bank for twenty-three years and had
relied on officers of the bank for financial advice.'" On several
occasions, he had borrowed money from the bank and at one time owed
the bank $17,800. "' The bank thus requested that he give it a mortgage
94. See Johnson, supra note 50, at 219.
95. See Anderson, supra note 71, at 365-66.
96. See Lodge & Cunningham, supra note 91, at 291.
97. See Hunt, supra note 65, at 741.
98. See id.
99. 64 P.2d 101 (Ariz. 1937).
100. See id. at 104.
101. See id.
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on some of his real estate to secure the debt. 2 Stewart's complaint
alleged that the bank falsely represented to him that it did not actually
want his property but had to secure the debt to satisfy certain banking
requirements. 3 When Stewart could not repay the debt, the bank
foreclosed on the property."°  Stewart alleged that because of his
confidential relationship with the bank and reliance on the bank's
representation that it did not want his property, he had been induced to
execute the mortgage.'03
The Arizona Supreme Court stated that ordinarily no confidential
relationship arises out of a debtor-creditor situation and noted that no
other court had previously considered whether a bank and its customer
could have a confidential relationship."° The court, although affirming
a dismissal of the action on procedural grounds, recognized that Stewart
had a cause of action against the bank based on a confidential relation-
ship because the bank acted as his financial advisor for twenty-three
years, and Stewart had relied on such advice. 107
The Supreme Court of Montana has also traditionally held that the
relationship between a bank and its customer is a debtor-creditor
relationship; however, in Deist v. Wachholz,0 8 the court made an
exception." After her husband died, the plaintiff, Joan Deist, obtained
advice from the president of the bank, who also happened to be a family
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 105.
105. See Stewart, 64 P.2d at 104-05.
106. See id at 106. "[A] confidential relationship giving rise to a fiduciary
obligation may include any business, social, or purely personal relationship in which
one party justifiably places trust and confidence in another to care for his or her welfare
and interests." Anderson, supra note 71, at 316.
107. See Stewart, 64 P.2d at 106. Although the case was decided in 1937, the
following language of the court seems quite modem:
It may have been that generations ago, when most commercial transactions
were for cash, or at least consisted merely of personal obligations between
vendor and purchaser, and ,the highly complicated modem structure of credit
and corporate securities did not exist, that banks, which were originally
merely places of security where a man might deposit his cash and valuables,
did not, as such, hold any greater confidential relations with their clients than
those between any other two businessmen. But times have changed. It is
almost inconceivable that any man should engage in financial transactions
of any magnitude in the modem time without having recourse to some bank
not only as a place of safety to keep his money, but as a place where he
might secure loans to conduct his business.
Id.
108. 678 P.2d 188 (Mont. 1984).
109. See id. at 193-94.
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friend, as to what to do with the family ranch."' The vice-president of
the bank, Paul Wachholz, found a buyer for Deist, but Deist did not
know that Wachholz was also a partner in the purchase."' Deist sought
to rescind the contract and claimed that Wachholz and the bank owed
her a fiduciary duty."' The court found that there was evidence that the
relationship between Deist and the bank went beyond that of debtor-
creditor to a fiduciary relationship; the Deists had been customers of the
bank for twenty-four years, and they had reposed trust and confidence
in the advice of the bank's president."
3
In Denison State Bank v. Madeira,"' the Supreme Court of Kansas
was not as sympathetic to the plaintiff's claim.' C.C. Madeira
invested in a car dealership, owned by Tom King, that was in need of
financial and management experience."' In order to make the invest-
ment, Madeira needed to obtain financing; thus, King introduced him
to the bank with which he had done business." 7 In his dealings with the
bank, Madeira was not fully informed about King's financial situation
with the bank."8 Thus, when the bank sued Madeira to recover on three
promissory notes, Madeira counterclaimed that the bank owed him a
fiduciary duty and breached it by failing to fully disclose King's
financial situation."19
The court in this case found that no fiduciary relationship existed
because Madeira was a sophisticated businessman and could have
discovered the facts undisclosed to him through other readily available
means."? While the court noted that fiduciary principles are equitable,
110. See id. at 190.
Ill. See id at 190-92.
112. See id at 192.
113. See id. at 193-94.
114. 640 P.2d 1235 (Kan. 1982).
115. See id at 1244.
116. See id at 1237-38.
117. See id. at 1238.
118. See id. For example, there were $15,000 of outstanding drafts for automobiles
and a $5000 overdraft in King's account with the bank. See id. In addition, Madeira
had planned on using money from rebates that were to be paid by the car manufacturer
to the dealership to pay off part of his initial loan. See id. at 1235. However, these
rebates had already been pledged to King's uncle, as security for a loan that the uncle
had made to King, and to the bank, as security for King's outstanding debt there. See
id. at 1238-39.
119. See id. at 1237-38.
120. See Denison State Bank, 640 P.2d at 1243. "[Olne may not abandon all caution
and responsibility for his own protection and unilaterally impose a fiduciary
relationship on another without a conscious assumption of such duties by the one
sought to be held liable as a fiduciary." Id. at 1243-44.
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incapable of precise definition, and determined on a case-by-case basis,
it described a non-traditional fiduciary as having the confidence of the
beneficiary, acting for the benefit of the beneficiary, and having
influence or an advantage over the beneficiary.' 2'
The court in First National Bank v. Brown"2 reached an opposite
result in a situation somewhat similar to Madeira.'" In that case, Dean
Evans planned on selling his failing service station to Wyn Brown.'24
Evans had previously borrowed money from First National Bank, and
the bank had taken substantial security interests on his property.' 2
Brown planned on borrowing from the same bank in order to purchase
the station, and throughout all of his negotiations and dealings with the
bank, he was never informed of the bank's lien on the property. 26 In
addition, Brown was not informed that part of the proceeds from his
note would be applied to Evans's existing debt. 27  When Brown
discovered these facts, he left the business, and the bank brought suit
against him when his note became due. 2
The court first noted that silence on the part of one party in an
arm's length transaction, such as lender-borrower, is ordinarily not
enough to impose a duty; however, if one party has superior knowledge
of the situation, a duty may ensue to disclose all facts material to the
transaction. 29 The court went on to hold that the bank did have such a
duty in this case. 3°
The court in Klein v. First Edina National Bank' failed to find a
fiduciary obligation on the part of the bank. 32 The plaintiff, Virginia
Klein, had volunteered to pledge shares of her stock as collateral to
enable her employer, Florence Schaub, to obtain a loan from. the bank
of which Klein was also a customer.'1 Klein testified that she did not
121. See id. at 1241.
122. 181 N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1970).
123. See id. at 183.
124. See id at 180.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 180-81.
127. See id. at 181.
128. See First Nat'! Bank, 181 N.W.2d at 181. While the court did not explain more
specifically why Brown left, it did state that after he discovered the liens on the
business, he told Evans that he no longer wanted to have any connection to the business
and then left. See id.
129. See idat 182.
130. See id.
131. 196 N.W.2d 619 (Minn. 1972) (per curiam).
132. See id. at 623 (per curiam).
133. See id. at 621 (per curiam).
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know that Schaub already owed the bank on another loan, nor did she
know that Schaub had assigned to the bank an account receivable from
her business." Klein was also not aware that the bank was going to
release the account receivable and use her stock alone as security.'
However, Klein did not ask the loan officer any questions about the
transaction and testified that she was very emotional and did not care
enough to even read the documents before she signed them. 3" When
the bank issued Klein a notice of foreclosure on her stock, she sued on
the basis that failure to inform her of all the details of the transaction
amounted to fraud.'
The court, however, did not agree with the plaintiff, despite the fact
that she had been a customer of the bank for twenty years, maintained
checking and saving accounts with the bank, rented a safety deposit box
from the bank, obtained a mortgage for real estate from the bank,
received the bank's assistance in transferring securities, and had
socialized with the wife of the bank's president on several occasions. 3
The court stated that if the bank had known or had reason to know that
Klein was placing her trust and confidence in the bank, the bank may
have had a duty to disclose all facts relevant to the transaction."' In this
case, however, the bank employee making the loan had not personally
met the plaintiff."°
A California court at one time even went so far as to hold that a
bank could be a "quasi-fiduciary" in some situations."" The same court
later applied this holding to Barrett v. Bank of America. 42 In Barrett, the
plaintiffs, owners of an electronics business, obtained a Small Business
Administration loan and a line of credit with Bank of America. 43 They
executed two personal guarantees to the bank to secure these loans.'"
About a month later, the plaintiffs technically defaulted on their loans
because their company's liability-to-assets ratio did not meet the bank's
134. See id. (per curiam).
135. See id. (per curiam).
136. See id. at 622 (per curiam).
137. See Klein, 196 N.W.2d at 622 (per curiam).
138. See id (per curiam).
139. See id. at 623 (per curiam).
140. See id. at 622-23 (per curiam). For example, the bank employee did not know
that the plaintiff was an alcoholic and lacked good judgment in financial matters. See
id. at 622 (per curiam).
141. See Commercial Cotton Co. v. United Cal. Bank, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551, 554 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1985).
142. 229 Cal. Rptr. 16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
143. See id. at 17.
144. See id.
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requirement. 4 ' The bank informed the plaintiffs that, if their company
merged with another, the other company would be responsible for their
loans, and their personal guarantees would be released.'" However,
when the company with which the plaintiffs' company merged filed for
bankruptcy, the bank assigned the plaintiffs' guarantees to the Small
Business Administration.'47  Because the bank did not honor its
promise to release the plaintiffs' guarantees, the plaintiffs raised several
causes of action against the bank, including fraud.'
The court found that there was substantial evidence to support a
constructive fraud theory.'49 The court stated that constructive fraud
generally arises in a situation where one party reposes trust and
confidence in another; the court called this type of relationship
confidential or fiduciary.' The court went on to state that a bank-
depositor relationship is at least quasi-fiduciary.' 1  However, after
much criticism, the same court in a later decision considered the term
"quasi-fiduciary" to be inappropriate.5 2
c. Case Examples from Arkansas
The Supreme Court of Arkansas has also entertained the idea that
a bank-customer relationship may go beyond that of debtor and creditor
145. See id. at 17-18.
146. See id. at 18.
147. See id.
148. See Barrett, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
149. See id. at 20. Because of this finding, the court of appeals held that the trial
court committed reversible error in refusing to give the requested instruction on
constructive fraud. See id. at 21.
150. See id. at 20.
151. See id.
152. See, e.g., Curtis, supra note 59, at 814-30 (criticizing Commercial Cotton for
being without precedent in California and criticizing Barrett for misapplying the case
law in the area of the bank-borrower relationship). The later decision that found
"quasi-fiduciary" inappropriate is Copesky v. Superior Court, 280 Cal. Rptr. 338, 348
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991). The court in Copesky, however, did not say that a bank had no
duty to its customers:
Our digest of the rule of Commercial Cotton might be stated as follows: The
ordinary relationship between commercial bank and its depositor is such as
to impose upon the bank a duty, derived from the obligation of good faith
and fair dealing implied in all contracts, to refrain from intentional breaches
of contract and from interjection of spurious and bad faith defenses to
contract claims, which duty if breached will give rise to an action in tort with
attendant entitlement to punitive damages.
Copesky, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 342.
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in certain situations. 3 In Marsh v. National Bank of Commerce,'54 Robert
Marsh and Gurvis Vines signed as guarantors on a promissory note in
the amount of $245,000." Two years prior to this, Vines executed a
note to the bank in the amount of $420,000, and at the time Vines and
Marsh signed as guarantors, Vines still owed a substantial portion of
this note." Marsh stated that if he had known about Vines's payment
history on his note, he would not have signed as a co-guarantor with
him because he was relying on Vines to pay the $245,000 note if
needed.' However, an employee of the bank testified that he told
Marsh that Vines could not borrow from the bank without assistance
and "'had problems of his own.'"' Marsh also said that he only
guaranteed the note "'as a favor to the bank."" 59
Marsh claimed that the bank breached a fiduciary duty to him, and
when the trial court failed to find such a relationship, he appealed.'"
The court of appeals stated the general rule that a relationship between
a bank and its customer is debtor-creditor. 6' The court then went on to
hold that a confidential relationship is not determined by any set rules,
but instead depends on the specific facts of the case.62 The court found
that in a debtor-creditor situation, the existence of a confidential
relationship is a question of fact, and the proponent of the relationship
has the burden of proving its existence. 63 The court eventually affirmed
the trial court's finding that no fiduciary relationship existed between
Marsh and the bank.'
Arkansas's highest court again failed to find a fiduciary duty on the
part of a bank in Country Corner Food & Drug, Inc. v. First State Bank &
Trust. Co.'65 Country Comer obtained a business loan from First State
153. See Marsh v. National Bank of Commerce, 37 Ark. App. 41, 822 S.W.2d 404
(1992).
154. 37 Ark. App. 41, 822 S.W.2d 404 (1992).
155. See id. at 42, 822 S.W.2d at 405.
156. See id. at 45, 822 S.W.2d at 406.
157. See id, 822 S.W.2d at 406.
158. See id at 45, 822 S.W.2d at 406.
159. See id. at 47, 822 S.W.2d at 408.
160. See Marsh, 37 Ark. App. at 47, 822 S.W.2d at 407.
161. See id., 822 S.W.2d at 407.
162. See id., 822 S.W.2d at 407-08. The court stated, "There is no set formula by
which the existence of a confidential relationship may be determined, for each case is
factually different and involves different individuals." Id., 822 S.W.2d at 407-08
(quoting Donaldson v. Johnson, 235 Ark. 348, 359 S.W.2d 810 (1962)).
163. See id., 822 S.W.2d at 408 (citing, as an example, Denison State Bank v.
Madeira, 640 P.2d 1235 (Kan. 1982)).
164. See id at 47-48, 822 S.W.2d at 408.
165. 332 Ark. 645, 966 S.W.2d 894 (1998).
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Bank & Trust in the amount of $194,734 to finance inventory." Two
men, who were business partners of the storeowners, signed the note as
guarantors. 67 When the note became due, the guarantors would not
sign a renewal, and the bank foreclosed on the note and collateral . 6 ,
After the foreclosure, Country Corner filed several tort causes of action
against the bank, including breach of fiduciary duty.'69 The circuit court
granted the bank's motion to dismiss on grounds that Country Corner
had failed to state a claim under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), and Country Corner appealed. 7"
In its complaint, Country Corner claimed that the bank established
a fiduciary relationship between itself and the bank when the bank's
attorney averred that he represented both the store and the bank in the
loan transaction.' Country Corner contended that the bank breached
its fiduciary duty when the attorney informed Country Corner that it did
not need to obtain independent counsel and also when the bank gave
such a substantial amount of financing on a one-year note to an
"unsophisticated borrower."'" The supreme court acknowledged that
certain facts can establish a relationship beyond debtor-creditor." The
166. See id. at 650, 966 S.W.2d at 896.
167. See id., 966 S.W.2d at 896.
168. See id., 966 S.W.2d at 896. After the foreclosure, the guarantors, Watson and
Shannon, filed suit against Country Comer, requesting that the court appoint a receiver,
to prevent Country Corner's owners from selling off the store's inventory. See id., 966
S.W.2d at 896. The bank intervened in this suit as well. See id., 966 S.W.2d at 896.
The circuit court did appoint a receiver who sold the store along with its assets. See id.,
966 S.W.2d at 896. Watson and Shannon then paid the outstanding balance of the note.
See id., 966 S.W.2d at 896.
169. See id. at 650-54, 966 S.W.2d at 896-98. Country Comer also filed suit against
the guarantors. See id. at 650, 966 S.W.2d at 896. The circuit court eventually granted
summary judgment to these parties. See id. at 651, 966 S.W.2d at 896. On appeal, the
supreme court failed to find any question of material fact and affirmed the circuit
court's grant of summary judgment to the guarantors. See id. at 657, 966 S.W.2d at
899.
170. See Country Corner Food & Drug, 332 Ark. at 651,966 S.W.2d at 896.
171. See id. at 654, 966 S.W.2d at 898.
172. See id., 966 S.W.2d at 898.
173. See id., 966 S.W.2d at 898 (citing Milam v. Bank of Cabot, 327 Ark. 256, 937
S.W.2d 653 (1997); J.W. Reynolds Lumber Co. v. Smackover State Bank, 310 Ark.
342, 836 S.W.2d 853 (1992); Marsh v. National Bank of Commerce, 37 Ark. App. 41,
822 S.W.2d 404 (1992)). In J W. Reynolds Lumber Co., the court held that for trust to be
established in what is a typical debtor-creditor relationship, the bank must know or
have reason to know of such trust. See JW. Reynolds Lumber Co., 310 Ark. 342, 347,
836 S.W.2d 853, 855 (1992) (citing Cherokee Carpet Mills v. Worthen Bank, 262 Ark.
776, 561 S.W.2d 310 (1987)). Again, the court found no fiduciary relationship on the
part of the bank. See id., 836 S.W.2d at 855.
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supreme court, however, disagreed that the facts of this case established
a fiduciary relationship. 74
C. Relationship Between Bank and Customer When Bank Is Selling
Credit Life Insurance
Credit life insurance is a special type of insurance that pays off the
balance of an outstanding debt when the debtor dies. "  Unlike
traditional insurance, credit life pays the creditor directly upon the death
of the debtor, rather than paying the beneficiary. 76 Credit life insurance
is often purchased when a person makes a major purchase, such as a
car, furniture, or a house.'" Because the premium is typically paid in
installments, the cost per month may appear to be small from the
debtor's viewpoint."" However, the cost of the insurance is usually
quite high, and the bank profits greatly from selling the insurance."'
For this reason, and because a debtor is often adequately covered
through another policy, credit life insurance is not always a sound
investment decision for the debtor.8
When a bank obtains credit life insurance for a customer, courts
have sometimes recognized a fiduciary duty on the part of the bank.''
One way in which such a duty can arise in the sale of credit life
insurance is through the special circumstances or facts of the situation,
including a reposing of trust and confidence.8 2
The case of Lowery v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co.8 3 is an example of
such a situation. Although not expressly finding that the bank was a
fiduciary, the court held that the jury should have been able to decide
whether the bank was negligent and had breached a fiduciary duty by
174. See Country Corner Food & Drug, 332 Ark. at 654, 966 S.W.2d at 898. "Lack
of sophistication and the alleged advice not to seek independent counsel at best may
have resulted in Country Corner's being misled, but these facts do not create a fiduciary
relationship." Id, 966 S.W.2d at 898.
175. See JoClaudia Mitchum, Comment, The Death of Credit Life Insurance: McCullar
v. Universal Underwriters Life Insurance Company, 27 CUMB. L. REv. 719(1996).
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See Mark Budnitz, The Sale of Credit Life Insurance: The Bank As Fiduciary, 62
N.C. L. REv. 295, 298 (1984).
179. See id at 297.
180. See id. at 297-98.
181. See id. at 299.
182. See id. at 300.
183. 592 So. 2d 79 (Miss. 1991).
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failing to inform the plaintiff that her credit life policies had expired.'"s
The plaintiff and her husband, the Lowerys, had taken out credit life
insurance on two notes through a group policy that the bank had with
an insurance company.Iu While Mr. Lowery was out of state working,
one of the notes came due." As a result, Mrs. Lowery informed Robert
Steinriede of the bank that her husband would not be able to take care
of the renewal until he returned home from work in two weeks.'"
When her husband did not return in two weeks, Mrs. Lowery called
again to ask if it would be okay to wait until he returned; this time
Steinriede's secretary instructed her to have her husband come in as
soon as he arrived home. 1s
However, Mr. Lowery died before ever returning home." 9 Mrs.
Lowery assumed that the credit life policy would pay off the notes, but
Steinriede informed her that the credit life policy on the notes had
expired."'o Mrs. Lowery then brought suit against the bank and the
insurance company.' 9" The court first held that without some statutory
requirement or policy provision, an insurer has no duty to inform the
insured about policy termination; thus, the trial court properly granted
the insurance company's motion for summary judgment."9  The court
then discussed what constitutes a fiduciary relationship and held that in
credit life insurance cases, a fiduciary relationship may be found on a
theory of contract, agency, or the reposing of trust and confidence."s9
184. See id at 85.
185. See id. at 80.
186. See id. at 80. Mr. Lowery was working as a crop duster in Louisiana. See id.
187. See id at 80-81. While Steinriede did not tell Mrs. Lowery that he would
extend the notes, he said something that made her believe that her husband would be
able to take care of the renewal when he returned home. See id at 81.
188. See iad
189. See Lowery, 592 So. 2d at 81. The court did not state how Mr. Lowery died,
only that he died on October 24th before returning home from his work in Louisiana.
See id.
190. See id
191. See id.
192. See id. at 83.
193. See id. (citing Mark Budnitz, The Sale of Credit Life Insurance: The Bank As
Fiduciary, 62 N.C. L. REv. 295, 299 (1984)). The court went on to discuss the case of
Stone v. Davis, 419 N.E.2d 1094 (Ohio 1981). See id. at 84. In Stone, a young couple
financed the purchase of a farm through a loan and wanted to obtain mortgage
insurance. See id. However, they were not informed that they had to obtain the
insurance themselves. See id. After a foreclosure action was instituted against them,
the wife claimed that the savings and loan acted negligently in failing to obtain
insurance for her and her husband. See id. (citing Stone, 419 N.E.2d at 1096). Because
of their age and inexperience with mortgages, the Supreme Court of Ohio agreed; when
the savings and loan did not inform them that they had to procure the insurance
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The court also discussed a case in which a question for the jury
existed as to whether a lender was negligent in failing to procure credit
life insurance on a theory that the lender was a quasi-fiduciary.'" The
court eventually held that, in this case, while no formal fiduciary
relationship was established, the jury could have found a fiduciary duty
because of the Lowerys' relationship with the bank.'"
Another way to analyze the relationship between the bank and its
customer when the bank sells credit life insurance is through principles
of agency.'" Agency principles are much more certain than those
applied in the fact-sensitive fiduciary situation because objective facts
determine whether the bank is an agent.'" An agency relationship is
formed when a principal consents to an agent acting on his behalf, and
the agent accepts this duty.'" The consent of both parties can be
reasonably inferred from their conduct, such as the agent performing the
task to which the principal consented.'" For example, when the
customer signs the Truth in Lending disclosure stating that he desires
credit life insurance, this act can manifest consent 2.. Similarly, when
the bank gives the customer the Truth in Lending form to sign, this act
may show consent to act as the agent for the customer.2 0'
If a bank and customer can be shown to have entered into a
consensual principal-agent relationship for the sale of the credit life
insurance, then the bank must act in accordance with traditional
fiduciary duties.' An agent has a duty to act with the care and skill
that is standard in his locality and to exercise any special skills he
possesses.203 The agent also must use reasonable efforts to give the
themselves, as was its usual policy, the savings and loan breached a fiduciary duty. See
id. (citing Stone, 419 N.E.2d at 1098).
194. See id. at 84-85 (citing Hutson v. Wenatchee Fed. Savings & Loan Assoc., 588
P.2d 1192 (Wash. 1978)).
195. See Lowery, 592 So. 2d at 85. The court noted the following facts as possibly
weighing toward the bank owing Mrs. Lowery a duty to inform her that her policy had
lapsed: Steinriede had dealt with the Lowerys on all of their loans; the Lowerys usually
took out credit life insurance; Mrs. Lowery knew little about the couple's financial
business; Steinriede represented to Mrs. Lowery that it would be fine to wait until her
husband returned home; and Mrs. Lowery was not told that the credit life policy would
not be in effect while the notes were on hold. See id
196. See Budnitz, supra note 178, at 301.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 320.
199. See id.
200. See id. at 321.
201. See id
202. See Budnitz, supra note 178, at 321-22.
203. See RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY (SECOND) § 379(1) (1958). The Restatement
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principal information that the principal would desire and that is relevant
to the transaction or relationship.' In addition, an agent must obey the
instructions of the principal if they are reasonable.2 5
Even though agency principles are more defined, the scope of the
agent's duty still depends somewhat on the facts of the situation.2"
Generally, courts, including those in Arkansas, have held that an
insured has a duty to educate himself regarding his insurance.2"7
However, a contributory negligence defense such as this may be
ineffective in a principal-agent relationship because the principal is
entitled to rely on the agent's care and skill.208 Some courts have held
that in situations where the agent is actively involved in the business
affairs of the insured and advises him on a regular basis, the agent may
have a duty to inform the insured of certain things.2"
IV. REASONING
The Arkansas Supreme Court began its analysis of Mans by stating
the specific issues that it would address.2 0 First, the court determined
what duty the bank owed the plaintiff based on her relationship with the
provides that "unless otherwise agreed, a paid agent is subject to a duty to the principal
to act with standard care and with the skill which is standard in the locality for the kind
of work which he is employed to perform and, in addition, to exercise any special skill
that he has." Id.
204. See id. § 381. The agent has "a duty to use reasonable efforts to give his
principal information which is relevant to affairs entrusted to him and which, as the
agent has notice, the principal would desire to have and which can be communicated
without violating a superior duty to a third person." Id.
205. See id § 385(1). An agent must "obey all reasonable directions in regard to the
manner of performing a service that he has contracted to perform." Id.
206. See Douglas L. Hallett et al., Liability of Insurance Agents and Brokers, 495
PLI/LmG. 519, 543 (1994).
207. See, e.g., Scott-Huff Ins. Agency v. Sandusky, 318 Ark. 613, 615, 887 S.W.2d
516, 517 (1994); Continental Cas. Co. v. Didier, 301 Ark. 159, 164, 783 S.W.2d 29, 31
(1990); Howell v. Bullock, 297 Ark. 552, 554, 764 S.W.2d 422, 424 (1989); Stokes v.
Harrell, 289 Ark. 179, 181, 711 S.W.2d 755, 756 (1986).
208. See Budnitz, supra note 178, at 323.
209. See Stokes v. Harrell, 289 Ark. 179, 181, 711 S.W.2d 755, 756 (1986) (citing
Bicknell, Inc. v. Havlin, 402 N.E.2d 116 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980); Hardt v. Brink, 192
F. Supp. 879 (W.D. Wash. 1961)). The court, however, said that this rule does not have
a "large following among the courts;" rather, the traditional rule that an insured must
educate himself regarding his policy is generally in place. See id, 711 S.W.2d at 756
(citing Nowell v. Dawn-Leavitt Agency, Inc., 617 P.2d 1164 (Ariz. 1980)).
210. See Mans, 340 Ark. at 521, 10 S.W.3d at 886-87.
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Bank.2 ' Next, the court decided whether the trial court erred in not
finding a duty on the part of the Bank based on trust.2 12
A. Majority Opinion
After reviewing a sidebar conference that took place between
counsel for Mans, counsel for the Bank, and the trial court judge,
Justice Brown, writing for the majority, noted that Mans's attorney had
apparently tried to prove a duty of trust on the part of the bank without
first establishing that there was a fiduciary relationship. 23  In this
dialogue, Mans's attorney actually stated that he was not claiming that
the Bank owed Mans a fiduciary duty.21' The court noted the contrast
between this statement and Mans's contention that her relationship with
the Bank was one of trust.
2 15
The court then addressed several rules of law that applied to the
issues of the case.2t 6 The court cited cases for the rule in Arkansas that
a policyholder has a duty to educate himself regarding his insurance
coverage.21 7 However, the court went on to note that some courts have
found a special relationship between an insurance agent and the insured,
which would impose a duty on the agent to inform the insured about
certain matters."t8 Such a duty would result when there is an established
211. See id, 10 S.W.3d at 886-87.
212. See id, 10 S.W.3d at 887.
213. See id at 523, 10 S.W.3d at 888.
214. See id. at 521, 10 S.W.3d at 887. The sidebar conference took place between
the attorneys and the judge after Mans's attorney began to ask her. on direct
examination whether she had trusted the bank during her twenty-three year relationship
with it. See id, 10 S.W.3d at 887. The Bank's attorney objected to the questioning
"because fiduciary or confidential relationship was not pled and to establish anything
other than just ordinary debtor-creditor relationship, those allegations have to be pled."
Id., 10 S.W.3d at 887. After this objection, Mans's attorney stated that he was not
claiming a fiduciary relationship, only that Mans relied on and trusted the Bank. See
id at 521-22, 10 S.W.3d at 887. The trial judge then stated that the situation was only
an arm's length transaction, and "if you have to trust, you have a fiduciary
relationship." Id, 10 S.W.3d at 887. In addition, after Mans's attorney had commented
on the fact that the bank received thirty to forty percent of the credit life premium, the
judge remarked, "Now you're close on the fact that he's an agent, but that doesn't have
anything to do with the type of insurance so, no, I don't think this is correct." Id, 10
S.W.3d at 887.
215. See id. at 523-24, 10 S.W.3d at 888.
216. See Mans, 340 Ark. at 524, 10 S.W.3d at 888.
217. See id., 10 S.W.3d at 888 (citing Scott-Huff Ins. Agency v. Sandusky, 318 Ark.
613, 887 S.W.2d 516 (1994); Continental Cas. Co. v. Didier, 301 Ark. 159, 783 S.W.2d
29 (1990); Howell v. Bullock, 297 Ark. 552, 764 S.W.2d 422 (1989); Stokes v. Harrell,
289 Ark. 179, 711 S.W.2d 755 (1986)).
218. See id., 10 S.W.3d at 888 (citing Stokes, 289 Ark. at 181, 711 S.W.2d at 756
2001]
UALR LAW REVIEW
relationship between the agent and the insured, and the agent is actively
involved in the insured's business matters."1 9 Finally, citing to its
decisions in Country Corner and J. W. Reynolds Lumber Co. v. Smackover
State Bank,22 the court stated that "factual underpinnings" are necessary
to establish a fiduciary relationship in a debtor-creditor situation."
Although the court agreed with Mans that this was an issue of first
impression, the court disagreed with her claim that a "special relation-
ship" had been established based solely on her trust in the Bank,
whereby the Bank owed her a duty of informing her that her policy had
lapsed.222 Supporting this conclusion, the court stated as it had in J.W.
Reynolds that a bank and its customer are normally debtor-creditor, and
to establish something more, factual underpinnings must be proved by
the proponent of the special relationship.'m The court then explained
that because Mans did not even attempt to prove a fiduciary relation-
ship, the trial court correctly concluded that the Bank did not owe her
a duty based on her trust in the Bank. 4
The court then explained that even if Mans had been attempting to
claim implied trust based on a fiduciary relationship or a special
relationship because of their course of dealing, she would have failed
for lack of substantial evidence, and a verdict would still have been
directed against her.2" The court stated that her lack of sophistication
and twenty-three year relationship with the Bank were not enough
evidence to establish a fiduciary relationship even if she had alleged
one in her complaint. 6  In addition, instead of proof that the Bank
advised the Manses regarding their business affairs, the court had proof
(1986)).
219. See id., 10 S.W.3d at 888 (citing Stokes, 289 Ark. at 181, 711 S.W.2d at 756
(1986)).
220. 310Ark. 342, 836 S.W.2d 853 (1992).
221. See Mans, 340 Ark. at 525, 10 S.W.3d at 889 (citing Country Comer Food &
Drug, Inc. v. First State Bank, 332 Ark. 645, 966 S.W.2d 894 (1998); Milam v. Bank
of Cabot, 327 Ark. 256, 937 S.W.2d 653 (1997); J.W. Reynolds Lumber Co. v.
Smackover State Bank, 310 Ark. 342, 836 S.W.2d 853 (1992)).
222. See id., 10 S.W.3d at 889.
223. See id. at 525-26, 10 S.W.3d at 889 (citing J.W. Reynolds Lumber Co. v.
Smackover State Bank, 310 Ark. 342, 836 S.W.2d 853 (1992)).
224. See id. at 526, 10 S.W.3d at 889.
225. See id., 10 S.W.3d at 889. The court stated that "[slubstantial evidence must
be sufficient to compel a conclusion one way or the other and must go beyond
suspicion or conjecture." Id., 10 S.W.3d at 889 (citing Barnes, Quinn, Flake, &
Anderson v. Rankins, 312 Ark. 240, 848 S.W.2d 924 (1993)).
226. See id., 10 S.W.3d at 889 (citing Country Comer Food & Drug, Inc. v. First
State Bank, 332 Ark. 645, 966 S.W.2d 894 (1998)).
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that the Manses themselves made the decision when to take out credit
life and when not to do so.'
The court then addressed the Bank's unwritten but customary
practice of informing its customers when their credit life policies had
lapsed.22 This fact was of no consequence to the court, however,
because Mans was not aware of the policy and also testified that she
knew her policy had a term of two years; therefore, she could not have
been relying on this practice. 9 Moreover, Mans gave no testimony that
the Bank had ever previously informed her or her husband that a credit
life policy had lapsed."3
The court then acknowledged that had certain facts been in place,
the result may not have been the same.231' For example, if the Bank had
previously informed the Manses that a policy had lapsed, or if the
Manses were not aware of the two-year term of the policy or that the
premiums were paid over ten years, or if the Manses had known of the
Bank's unwritten policy, the court would have viewed the situation
differently. 2
The court concluded by analogizing this case to that of Country
Corner wherein the bank was found to have no fiduciary duty to its
"unsophisticated" customers. 3  The court stated that if it agreed with
Mans's claim that the Bank owed her a duty, it would be igiioring case
law that an insured has a duty to educate herself regarding her insur-
ance. 4  The court then affirmed the trial court's grant of a directed
verdict to the Bank.235
227. See Mans, 340 Ark. at 526, 10 S.W.3d at 890.
228. See id., 10 S.W.3d at 890.
229. See id, 10 S.W.3d at 890. Further, the court noted that although she knew the
policy premiums were financed over ten years, she assumed her policy was still in
existence because her note payment remained the same each month. See id. at 526-27,
10 S.W.3d at 890.
230. See id. at 527, 10 S.W.3d at 890. The court observed that it had no way of
knowing whether Mr. Mans knew that the policy had expired since he was the one who
had gone to the Bank to renew the June 21, 1995 loan. See id., 10 S.W.3d at 890.
231. Seeid., 10 S.W.3d at 890.
232. See id., 10 S.W.3d at 890 (citing Lowery v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 592
So. 2d 79 (Miss. 1991)).
233. See Mans, 340 Ark. at 527, 10 S.W.3d at 890.
234. See id., 10 S.W.3d at 890.
235. See id., 10 S.W.3d at 890.
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B. Dissenting Opinion
Based on the Arkansas Supreme Court's precedent that a gratuitous
undertaking can result in a duty to act with care, Justice Glaze dis-
sented."" He stated that liability for failing to act when one has a duty
to act, or nonfeasance, has been recognized more and more throughout
the last century.2 Justice Glaze then stated that although it may have
been a gratuitous undertaking, the Bank assumed a duty to act with care
when it adopted its practice of informing customers that their credit life
policies had lapsed. " 's
The dissent disagreed with the majority's claim that Mans had no
right to rely on the unwritten policy because she was not aware of it. 1 9
In support of his belief, Justice Glaze stated that the pedestrian struck
in Haralson v. Jones Truck Line "' did not know that the truck driver had
signaled the truck behind him to pass; however, the court imposed a
duty on the truck driver.2 ' Therefore, the dissent concluded that it was
irrelevant that Mans did not know of the Bank's policy.4 2  For these
236. See id. at 528, 10 S.W.3d at 890 (Glaze, J., dissenting) (citing Haralson v. Jones
Truck Line, 223 Ark. 813, 270 S.W.2d 892 (1954)). In Haralson, a truck driver signaled
to the truck driving behind him that it was safe to pass. See id, 10 S.W.3d at 891
(Glaze, J., dissenting). When the truck behind veered into the left lane to pass, he
struck and killed a man who was walking on the left side of the road. See id., 10
S.W.3d at 891 (Glaze, J., dissenting). The Haralson court held that although the truck
driver was under no duty to give the signal, once he did, he had a duty to act with
ordinary care. See id, 10 S.W.3d at 891 (Glaze, J., dissenting) (citing Haralson, 223
Ark. at 816-17, 270 S.W.2d at 894-95)).
237. See id, 10 S.W.3d at 891 (Glaze, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that
liability for nonfeasance has been imposed more frequently in the last century in the
following situation:
[The plaintiff is typically in some respect particularly vulnerable and
dependent upon the defendant who, correspondingly, holds considerable
power over the plaintiffs welfare. In addition, such relations have often
involved some existing or potential economic advantage to the defendant.
Fairness in such cases thus may require the defendant to use his power to
help the plaintiff, based upon the plaintiff's expectation of protection, which
itself may be based upon the defendant's expectation of financial gain.
Id., 10 S.W.3d at 891 (Glaze, J., dissenting) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 374 (5th ed. 1984)).
238. See id at 528-29, 10 S.W.3d at 891 (Glaze, J., dissenting). The dissent also
observed the fact that the Bank acted as agent of the insurance company in selling
credit life insurance and receiving thirty to forty percent of policy premiums. See id.
at 528, 10 S.W.3d at 891 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
239. See Mans, 340 Ark. at 529, 10 S.W.3d at 891 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
240. 223 Ark. 813, 270 S.W.2d 892 (1954).
241. See Mans, 340 Ark. at 529, 10 S.W.3d at 891 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
242. See id at 529, 10 S.W.3d at 891 (Glaze, J., dissenting). Justice Glaze's exact
reasoning was as follows:
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reasons, Justice Glaze believed that the Bank did owe Mans a duty and
would have reversed the trial court's decision.4 3
V. SIGNIFICANCE
The Arkansas Supreme Court in Mans made it clear that it will not
recognize a fiduciary duty that has not been pleaded by the plaintiff,
even if, perhaps, the failure to plead the duty was unintentional. 2' The
court was seemingly perplexed as to why the plaintiff did not plead
fiduciary duty when the duty that she attempted to place on the Bank
was fiduciary in nature.2 45  The court's perplexity is apparent in its
observation that although Mans claimed a special relationship based on
trust, she did not characterize it as fiduciary.2" Therefore, one can only
speculate as to why a fiduciary duty was not pleaded. Perhaps, Mans's
attorney realized that a duty between a bank and its customer is
ordinarily debtor-creditor and, therefore, tried to establish a duty based
on trust alone. Perhaps also, he did not realize that the Arkansas
Supreme Court, like many other courts, has recognized that a non-
traditional fiduciary duty can be placed on a bank when certain facts
and circumstances exist. In any event, future plaintiffs trying to
establish a relationship with their bank beyond debtor-creditor should
be cognizant of the importance of explicitly pleading a fiduciary duty.
Furthermore, future plaintiffs should also be warned that the charge
of fiduciary duty must be supported with substantial and sympathetic
facts in their favor in order to establish a non-traditional fiduciary
duty.24 7 Even if Mans's attorney had explicitly pleaded a fiduciary
relationship, the Arkansas Supreme Court still would not have imposed
a fiduciary duty on the Bank because the court found that she did not
have enough proof.2" The fact that Mans was "unsophisticated" and
had a twenty-three year relationship with the Bank were not enough to
ward off a directed verdict. 9 More importantly, the court did not find
The [pedestrian] in Haralson, with his back to the traffic, was unaware that
one truck driver had just signaled another that it was safe to pass, yet this
court found a duty existed. Thus, in the circumstances now before us, it did
not matter that Ms. Mans may have had no knowledge of the bank's policy.
Id., 10 S.W.3d at 891 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
243. See id, 10 S.W.3d at 891 (Glaze, J., dissenting).
244. See id. at 527, 10 S.W.3d at 890.
245. See id. at 523, 10 S.W.3d at 888.
246. See id. at 523-24, 10 S.W.3d at 888.
247. See Mans, 340 Ark. at 525, 10 S.W.3d at 889.
248. See id. at 526, 10 S.W.3d at 889-90.
249. See id., 10 S.W.3d at 890.
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that the Bank had followed a practice of informing its customers when
their credit life policies had lapsed." ° Consequently, the amount of
proof necessary for a plaintiff to succeed in establishing a fiduciary duty
on her bank is unpredictable and appears to depend in large part on how
sympathetic the plaintiff is in the eyes of the court.
Bearing in mind that the court will not impose a duty which has not
been pleaded by the plaintiff, and considering that the facts necessary
to establish a non-traditional fiduciary relationship are imprecise and
uncertain, a plaintiff seeking to impose a duty on his bank in the sale of
insurance may be better off basing his claim on principles of agency.
If a plaintiff can establish a consensual principal-agent relationship
between himself and the bank in the sale of credit life insurance, then
the bank will be regarded as a fiduciary in the traditional sense.
Both the bank and its customers benefit from injecting agency
principles into such a relationship. The bank knows with more certainty
what activities will subject it to the status of fiduciary, and a plaintiff,
such as Mrs. Mans, will not have to provide the obscure proof that a
court desires in order to prove a fiduciary relationship." Of course,
when the transaction at issue does not involve the sale of insurance, a
plaintiff seeking to impose a fiduciary duty on his bank will not get the
benefit of agency principles; in that case, the plaintiff will be forced to
revert to the difficult task of creating a "fact-sensitive" fiduciary
relationship.
Robyn Phillips Allmendinger"
250. See id, 10 S.W.3d at 890.
251. See supra notes 196-209 and accompanying text.
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